“9/11” and After—A British View by Howard, Michael
Naval War College Review
Volume 55
Number 4 Autumn Article 3
2002
“9/11” and After—A British View
Michael Howard
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Howard, Michael (2002) "“9/11” and After—A British View," Naval War College Review: Vol. 55 : No. 4 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/3
Born in London in 1922, Dr. Howard earned bachelor’s
and master’s degrees in modern history at Oxford before
serving in the British army in World War II (Italian
campaign, twice wounded, Military Cross). After the
war he taught at King’s College, University of London,
becoming the institution’s first lecturer in war studies,
then professor in war studies, and founding the Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). In 1968 he
became a senior research fellow at All Souls College, Ox-
ford, then Chichele Professor of the History of War, earn-
ing a D.Litt. from Oxford in 1977. From 1980 to 1989 he
was Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, and
from 1989 to 1993 he held the Robert A. Lovett chair of
Military and Naval History at Yale University. He is to-
day president emeritus of IISS, a fellow of the British
Academy, and a foreign corresponding member of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Of his many
publications, his most recent books are The First World
War: A Very Short Introduction (2002) and The Les-
sons of History (1991); other especially well known
books are Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion
of France 1870–1871 (1961, 2d rev. ed. 2001), The
Causes of Wars (1983), and the now-standard English
translation (with Peter Paret) of Clausewitz’s On War
(1976). The present article is adapted from a Raymond
A. Spruance Lecture delivered at the Naval War College
on 17 April 2002.
© 2002 by Sir Michael Howard
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2002, Vol. LV, No. 4
1
Howard: “9/11” and After—A British View
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
”9/11” AND AFTER
A British View
Sir Michael Howard
It may seem rather unnecessary to call any assertion by an Englishman “a Brit-ish view.” The views that I am going to express are probably shared by many
Americans, continental Europeans, and Russians, to say nothing of Chinese, In-
dians, Brazilians, and the rest of the human race. I also suspect that quite a large
number of my fellow countrymen may not share them—mine is certainly not
the British view. But my views have inevitably been shaped, and probably preju-
diced, by my national background and personal experience.
The British experience of terrorism on our own soil—mainly, though not en-
tirely, at the hands of the Irish—goes back for well over a hundred years. I myself
lived for two decades in London when it was a target of terrorist attacks. The loss
of life was mercifully light, but those attacks did kill people, caused untold dam-
age to property, and inflicted immense inconvenience to millions of London
commuters. To take only one small but telling example: even today you will not
find, in any main-line railway station, either a trash can or a left-luggage locker.
They are far too convenient for the placement of Irish Republican Army bombs.
In Belfast, of course, the situation was far worse. Many more people were killed,
and much property was destroyed. There were times, I admit, seeing collectors
for NORAID (the Irish Northern Aid Committee) rattling their boxes in the bars
of Boston, when some of us thought that the United States might do just a little
more to help us with our own war against terrorism. I make this point not just to
have a dig at the Yanks (though this never does any harm) but to remind them
that terrorism, in one form or another, has been going on for quite a long time
and that the ethics involved are not always straightforward.
But the IRA attacks, of course, were pinpricks compared to the atrocities of 11
September 2001. This was an escalation of terrorist activity as great, and as
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threatening to mankind, as was the explosion of the first nuclear weapon in
comparison to the “conventional” campaigns that had preceded it. We under-
stood very well that “9/11” posed a threat to ourselves, not just to the United
States. By “ourselves” I mean not simply the British or even “the West” but every
country—irrespective of location, race, or creed—that was attempting to create
or maintain civil societies based on democratic consensus, human rights, and
the rule of law—all the principles for which we had fought two terrible world
wars. The attack on the Pentagon in Washington may have been aimed specifi-
cally at the United States, but those on the World Trade Center in New York, a su-
pranational institution housing a multinational population in the greatest
polyglot city in the world, was directed against the nerve centre of an interna-
tional community of which the United States is certainly the heart but that em-
braces the whole developed world. That was why the whole of that world—in
fact, the whole world, with the exception only of a few predictable rogue
states—immediately declared its support to the United States in its hour of need.
That is why I must admit to a twinge of annoyance whenever I hear the
phrase “America’s War against Terror.” It is not just “America’s War.” We are all in
it. Of course, Americans were the major victims, or at least have been up till now.
Of course, the Americans are able, with their immense military resources, to
make the major contribution in any military campaign that has to be fought. But
American citizens were not the only people who suffered on 11 September. The
United States is not the only nation with troops in Afghanistan—and if there are
not larger contributions from allies, it is because the U.S. high command made it
clear from the very beginning, for understandable reasons, that it did not want
them.
In any case, armed forces are not the only, or perhaps even the most impor-
tant, instruments in dealing with terrorism. Intelligence services, police forces,
immigration officials, financial managers, diplomats, even theologians, can play,
and indeed are playing, an equally important role in the struggle. So to call it
“America’s War,” and even more to wage it as if it were just “America’s War,” is to
miss its full significance. It is a profound and global confrontation between, on
the one hand, those who believe in all the civilized and civilizing values inherited
from the Enlightenment, and on the other those who detest those values and fear
them as a threat to their own core beliefs and traditional ways of life. In this con-
frontation armed force must inevitably play a part, but the struggle can never be
won by armed forces alone—not even those of the United States.
So is “war” the right word to describe the conflict? I do not think that it is pe-
dantic to ask this question. Journalists and politicians may have to reduce com-
plex issues to headlines or sound bites; professional students of war and of
international relations have to be more precise. The word “war” is dangerously
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misleading. It suggests a conflict waged against a clearly defined political adver-
sary by armed forces to whose activities everything else is subsidiary; more im-
portant, it connotes a conflict that can end in a clear victory. This mind-set is
revealed whenever the press speculates about “the next phase” in “the war
against terror.” For the media it is a conflict conducted in a series of military
campaigns. After Afghanistan, where? Iraq? Somalia? Yemen?
But in fact there need be no “next phase.” The campaign is being waged the
whole time, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, all over the world. So long
as there are no further outrages,
we can be said to be winning
it—winning through interna-
tional police work, diplomacy,
financial pressure, and propa-
ganda. Whether another military campaign will be needed remains an open
question. If we play our cards properly, we may succeed in rooting out al-Qa‘ida
and its associates without any further military action at all.
Still, it is perhaps inevitable that the word “war” should be used as an analogy,
in the same way that we speak of a war against disease, or against drugs, or
against crime—the mobilisation of all national resources to deal with a great so-
cial evil. But these are campaigns that cannot be “won” in any military sense.
Crime and disease as such cannot be “defeated.” We have to live with them. They
can, however, be reduced to acceptable levels. It is the same with terrorism. Ter-
rorism is a strategy, a means of making war, the classic instrument of the weak
against the strong. It is used by desperate and ruthless people who are deter-
mined to bring down apparently immoveable forces of authority by any meth-
ods that lie to hand. It was used long before al-Qa‘ida was ever thought of, and it
will continue to be used long after al-Qa‘ida has been forgotten. But if we are to
deal with terrorism effectively, we need to know precisely who our adversaries
are, how they are motivated, and where they come from.
First, even if a “war” against “terrorism” in general can no more be “won”
than a war against disease, particular diseases can nonetheless be controlled or
even eliminated. So can particular terrorist groups. Today we are dealing with an
exceptionally dangerous network of transnational conspirators using all the tra-
ditional instruments of terrorism. They strike at soft targets. Their object is to
gain publicity for their cause, to demoralise and discredit established authori-
ties, and to gain popular support by provoking them into overreaction. Govern-
ments should regard them as criminals—criminals of a particularly dangerous
kind. The appropriate instruments for dealing with them will be intelligence
services and police, backed where necessary by special warfare units. The use of
regular armed forces should be seen as a last resort, especially if one is dealing
1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Dystopian scenarios of a kind hitherto
confined to Hollywood have now become real
possibilities, if not yet probabilities.
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with urban terrorists. It is one thing to conduct a campaign in the sparsely in-
habited mountains of Afghanistan or the jungles of Malaya. It is quite another to
do so in the streets of a modern city, whether Londonderry or Jenin. In such an
environment, armies, however hard they may try to exercise restraint, are bound
to cause collateral damage that plays into the hands of terrorist propaganda. In
plain English, a great many innocent people—small children, pregnant women,
the elderly, the helpless—will be killed. The British learned all about this in
Northern Ireland. The Israeli defence forces are experiencing this in dealing with
Palestinian terrorists today. Such a campaign gives the terrorists exactly the kind
of publicity, and belligerent status, that they need.
If terrorists can provoke the government to using regular armed forces
against them, they have already taken a very important trick. They have been
promoted to the status of “freedom fighters,” a “liberation army,” and may win
popular support from sympathisers all over the world. Even if they are defeated,
their glorious memory will inspire their successors. Pictures of Che Guevara
adorned the walls of student dormitories for a generation, and I am afraid that
images of Osama bin Laden will occupy the same place of honour in Islamic
equivalents for quite as long.
Nonetheless, there are times when one cannot avoid the use of military force.
It has to be used when the terrorists are able to operate on too large a scale to be
dealt with by normal policing methods, as was the case in Ireland and is now in
Israel. It has to be used when enemies establish themselves in territory that is vir-
tually “no-man’s-land.” Finally, it has to be used when they enjoy the protection
of another sovereign state.
For the flushing of terrorists or their equivalents out of no-man’s-land we
have plenty of historical precedent. The Caribbean was a nest of pirates until
cleaned up in the eighteenth century. The coasts of the Mediterranean were ter-
rorised by Barbary pirates until the U.S. Marine Corps landed on the shores of
Tripoli. Today “failed states” like Yemen and Somalia cannot prevent their terri-
tory being used as terrorist bases, and armed force must be used to flush such
foes out. Even states that in other respects may be achieving limited success in es-
tablishing the rule of law, such as Colombia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, may
need help in eliminating terrorist elements on their own territory. When a ter-
rorist organization enjoys the open protection and support of another sovereign
state, as was the case with al-Qa‘ida and the ruling government of Afghanistan,
there is a serious casus belli, and a regular war may be the only way to bring the
criminals to justice. (Whether it is always wise to do so is another matter. In 1914
the Austrian government took advantage of that excuse to declare war on Serbia
and thereby caused a world war. Also, it is not at all obvious that the best way of
H O W A R D 1 3
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dealing with IRA supporters in the United States would have been for the British
to burn down the White House again.)
The struggle against a global terrorist network, then, though it may be mis-
leading to call it a war, may involve specific wars. When it does involve such a
war, if we are to retain our self-respect and the regard of the international com-
munity as a whole, we should conduct it in accordance with the obligations and
constraints that the civilized world has developed for armed conflicts over the
past three hundred years. The war should not be undertaken unless legitimized
by general international support. In conducting it, care should be taken to avoid
collateral damage. Enemy forces should be given the protection of the Geneva
Conventions that we expect for our own. The status of members of terrorist or-
ganizations that do not belong to the armed forces of the enemy should be de-
fined, and individuals suspected of criminal acts should be tried and judged
accordingly. Not least important, we should have a clear vision of the long-term
objective of the war; victory in the field must be converted into a stable peace.
War, in short, is a serious matter, not just a manhunt on a rather larger scale.
That is why there was so much hesitation in the international community as a
whole, not least in the United Kingdom, when the president of the United States
linked the campaign against the terrorist network responsible for the atrocities
of 11 September with a broader “axis of evil,”* consisting primarily of countries
hostile to the United States that are developing “weapons of mass destruc-
tion”—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. These are all very different cases, and each
of them needs to be considered on its merits. There is some evidence linking
Saddam Hussein with al-Qa‘ida, but no more than points to Libya, or Syria, or
even Saudi Arabia. The real charge against Saddam is that he is continuing to de-
velop weapons of mass destruction in defiance of United Nations prohibition,
and he should certainly be stopped—but that is rather a different matter. In the
case of Iran there is a stronger connection with al-Qa‘ida, which enjoys the open
support of the mullahs; however, in that country modernising and Western-
leaning elements have made huge headway since the days of the Ayatollah
Ruholla Khomeini, and to condemn their entire nation as “evil” does little to
help them. As for North Korea, though it is a very rogue state indeed, linking it
with the Islamic fundamentalism that inspired the perpetrators of “9/11” has
caused general bewilderment.
Certainly, all three are problem states that pose dangers to global stability, but
opinions quite justifiably differ as to how urgent are the threats they respectively
1 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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pose and how they can best be dealt with. Their connection with the “9/11”
atrocity is at best remote, and “regime changes” in them could not prevent a new
such outrage. There is a real danger that in enlarging the objective of its cam-
paign from a war against a specific terrorist organization to a general and almost
indefinable “War against Terror,” the United States is not only losing the support
of many of its friends and necessary allies but becoming distracted from the real
long-term threat that emerged in Manhattan, the Pentagon, and rural Pennsyl-
vania on 11 September. That horrific event was like the sudden eruption of a
flame from a fire that had long been smouldering underground. It will continue
to smoulder whatever happens to Saddam Hussein.
Although terrorism, like war itself, is probably as old as mankind, there are two
particularly alarming features of the present situation. The first is the new vul-
nerability to terrorist attack of our fragile and interdependent societies. The de-
struction of the twin towers and the gouging of the Pentagon were horrific and
spectacular, but the actual damage caused was finite. The massacre of some three
thousand people was horrific and spectacular enough, but if nuclear or chemical
weapons had been used the death toll would have been at least ten times as great.
The disruption of world trade was traumatic, but it was temporary and minimal;
skilful infestation of global computer networks could have magnified and
prolonged that disruption indef-
initely. The terrorist attacks of 11
September constituted a single if
terrible act; a linked series of
such catastrophes could have
caused widespread panic, eco-
nomic crisis, and political turbulence on a scale that could make democratic
government almost impossible.
Dystopian scenarios of a kind hitherto confined to Hollywood have now be-
come real possibilities, if not yet probabilities. They could all be caused, like the
destruction of the twin towers, by conspiratorial networks that need no state
sponsorship to provide them with weapons, expertise, finance, or motivation.
These “nonstate actors” (to use political-science jargon) are nourished and sup-
ported by the very societies they are attempting to destroy. Their members have
been educated in Western universities, trained in Western laboratories and fly-
ing schools, and financed, however unwittingly, by global consortiums. They are
not tools of Saddam Hussein or anyone else. We have bred and educated them
ourselves. One can buy box-cutters and airway schedules nearer home than
Baghdad, Tehran, or Pyongyang.
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The second feature of this breed of terrorists is even more disquieting—their
motivation. Normally, terrorism has been a method used to achieve a specific
political objective. In nineteenth-century Russia, where the technique was in-
vented, the goal was the overthrow of the tsarist regime. In the Ireland of Sinn
Fein it was liberation from British rule. In British-ruled Palestine in the 1940s,
the terrorist tactics of Irgun and the Stern Gang were highly effective in securing
the establishment of a Jewish state. Once their objective is achieved, such terror-
ists—now transformed into “freedom fighters”—are welcomed into the com-
munity of nations and their leaders become respected heads of state, chatting
affably with American presidents on the lawn of the White House. The terrorist
activities of contemporary Islamic fundamentalists are certainly linked to one
particular political struggle—what they see as the attempt of the Palestinians to
achieve independent statehood and recognition, which is a struggle that, in spite
of the methods they use, enjoys a wide measure of support throughout the Is-
lamic world. But even if that attempt were successful and President Arafat were
once again received in the White House, this time as head of a fully fledged Pales-
tinian state, the campaign of the fundamentalists would not come to an end. The
roots of the campaign go far deeper, and the objectives of the terrorists are far
more ambitious. The fundamentalist campaign is rooted in a visceral hatred and
contempt for Western civilization as such and resentment at its global ascen-
dancy. The object of the extremists is to destroy it altogether.
Here this analysis becomes influenced not so much by a British as a European
background—or rather, by European history. This teaches that there is nothing
new about such hatred and that it is not peculiar to Islam. It originated in Eu-
rope two centuries ago in reaction to the whole process of what is loosely known
as the Enlightenment. It was a protest against the erosion of traditional values
and authorities by the rationalism, the secularism, and the freethinking that
both underlay and were empowered by the American and French Revolutions. It
gained further strength in the nineteenth century as industrialisation and mod-
ernisation transformed European society, creating general disorientation and
alienation that was to be exploited by extreme forces on both the Left and the
Right. By the beginning of the twentieth century it was reinforced by mounting
alarm at the development of a global economy that, in spite of the growth of de-
mocracy, seemed to place the destinies of millions in the hands of impersonal
and irresponsible forces beyond the control of national governments. It was, in
short, a cry of rage against the whole seemingly irresistible process that has re-
sulted from the dissolution of traditional constraints on thought and enterprise
and the release of the dynamic forces of industrial development collectively
known as “capitalism.” It was to provide the driving force behind both fascism
1 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 4, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/3
and communism, and it was to be one of the underlying causes of the Second, if
not indeed the First, World War.
The experience of Europe in the nineteenth century was to be repeated in the
twentieth and continues today throughout what is still, for want of a better label,
described as the “third world.” There also industrialisation has led to urbanisa-
tion, with the resulting breakdown of traditional authority and the destruction
of cultures rooted in tribal rule and land tenure. There also medical advances, by
reducing the death rate, have led to unprecedented increases in the population.
There also a surplus population has fled from the countryside to overcrowded
cities, and from the cities to, where possible, overseas. But there the similarity
ends. In the nineteenth century there was a New World prepared to accept immi-
grants on an unlimited scale. Today there is not. The third world has to absorb its
own surplus population, as best it can.
In nineteenth-century Europe the immiseration of the Industrial Revolution
was certainly eased by emigration, but it was eventually conquered by the very
economic development that had originally caused it. Market economies over-
came their teething troubles and converted their hungry masses into consumers
with money in their pockets. State
activities expanded to curb the
excesses of the market and to care
for its casualties. Today the gen-
eral assumption in the West is
that the problems of the third
world, with the help of Western capital and technology, will ultimately be
solved by the same process—the creation of thriving national economies that
will absorb surplus labour and transform the unemployed masses into prosper-
ous consumers, within a stable infrastructure provided by an efficient and
uncorrupt state.
The trouble is that this very goal—that of a prosperous materialist society
with religion as an optional extra—appalls Islamic fundamentalists, as well as
many Muslims who are not fundamentalists. They regard Western society not as
a model to be imitated but as an awful warning, a Sodom and Gomorrah, an ex-
ample of how mankind should not live. Instead they embrace a heroic anti-
culture, one that has much in common with the European ideologues who
protested against the decadence of Western materialism and preached redemp-
tion of mankind through war; they hold it, however, with a fanaticism possible
only to those who believe that they will receive their reward in an afterlife. Like
fascism and communism, their creed appeals to the idealistic young, especially
those who feel rejected by the society around them, as do all too many immi-
grants in the cities of Europe. Like fascism and communism, it attracts all who
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are disillusioned with the promises of liberal capitalism or are suffering from its
defects.
It is only natural that this appeal should be most effective among peoples for
whom the world of Western capitalism is not only profoundly alien and offen-
sive in itself—with its godlessness, its shamelessness, its materialism, and its bla-
tant vulgarity—but worse, seems to be winning, bulldozing away the world of
their ancestors and the values that held their societies together for aeons. For
them the enemy is not just Western capitalism as such but its powerhouse, the
United States, the Great Satan. More specifically, it is those elements within Is-
lamic societies that appear to be cooperating with it.
Nevertheless—and this cannot be too often or too strongly stressed—there is
as little sympathy in the Islamic world for the methods and objectives of the ter-
rorists as there is in the West. Whatever their self-appointed spokesmen may say,
the rising expectations of the Islamic peoples are almost certainly focused on
achieving the kind of material well-being that the West ultimately promises (and
the terrorists reject), so long as that goal remains compatible with their core cul-
tural beliefs. Al-Qa‘ida and its associates are exactly the kind of puritanical icon-
oclasts who emerge in all revolutionary situations and try to remould humanity
to fit their own ideal worlds. In unstable societies the ruthlessness and fanati-
cism of such people bring them to the fore and enable them, however briefly, to
seize power and do an untold amount of harm.
So the global reach of contemporary terrorists should not blind us to the fact
that their strength derives from the general instability of contemporary Islamic
societies and that therefore the problem, ultimately, is one for Islam itself. If
there is indeed “a war against terrorism,” it has to be fought and won within the
Islamic world. The role of the West must be to support and encourage those who
are fighting that war, and we must take care that we do nothing to make their
task more difficult.
This will not be easy. How can we support our friends in the Islamic world,
those who are seeking their own path to modernisation, without making them
look like Western stooges, betraying their own cultures? How should we treat
their leaders who are as hostile to—and as threatened by—Islamic fundamen-
talism as we are but who use what we regard as unacceptable methods to sup-
press it? How can we avoid being associated with the wealthy elements in Islamic
countries that are most resistant to the social changes that alone can make possi-
ble the spread and acceptance of Western ideas?
These are all problems for the long run. What about the short?
There are two paradigms for dealing with “international terrorism,” both
equally misleading. One is the liberal ideal, held by well-meaning Europeans and
H O W A R D 1 8
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perhaps a good many well-meaning Americans as well. According to this, inter-
national terrorists should be dealt with by police action under the auspices of
the United Nations. Any military action should be conducted by UN forces, and
suspected terrorists should be brought to trial before an international court. The
other is rather more popular in the United States—“America’s War,” a private
fight conducted by the armed forces of the United States against almost cosmic
forces of evil. In this conflict no holds are barred; America must do “whatever it
takes” to destroy those forces. The support of the outside world is welcomed, in-
deed expected—as President Bush put it, “Either you are with us, or you are with
the terrorists”*—but the war will be waged and won by Americans without any
interference by well-intentioned but wimpish allies, condemnation by woolly-
minded do-gooders, or constraints imposed by outmoded concepts of interna-
tional law.
The first of these paradigms, the liberal ideal, may be desirable, but is quite
unrealistic. Apart from anything else, in their present mood the American peo-
ple are simply not prepared to subject themselves to any international authority
or to hand over the perpetrators of the “9/11” massacre to any foreign jurisdic-
tion. In any case, the record shows that “the international community” as such is
quite unable to organize any serious military intervention unless the United
States not only supports it but plays a leading role. Whether the other nations in-
volved like it or not, the campaign against international terrorism must be con-
ducted on terms acceptable to, though not necessarily dictated by, the United
States, and in waging it American resources will be indispensable.
The other view, “America’s War,” may be realistic, but it is both undesirable
and likely to be counterproductive. By nationalising the war in this manner,
there is a real danger that the United States will antagonise the entire Moslem
world, lose the support of its natural allies in the West, and play into the hands of
its former opponents, at present quiescent but by no means eliminated, in Russia
and the People’s Republic of China. This would be a profound tragedy. In 1945
the United States was able to convert a wartime alliance into a framework for
world governance capable of embracing its former enemies and surviving the
tensions and trials of the Cold War. In 1990 its rapid liquidation of the Cold War
and generosity to its former adversaries held out genuine promise of a New
World Order. The impact of “9/11” seemed to provide just such another catalytic
moment. America’s traditional rivals and adversaries fell over one another in of-
fering support, which was eagerly accepted. It looked as if a genuine world com-
munity was being forged, one of entirely new range and strength. Out of the evil
H O W A R D 1 9
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done on 11 September, it seemed, unprecedented good might come. It still might,
and it still should.
But it will only come if the United States abandons its unilateral approach to
the handling of international terrorism and recognises that the problem can ef-
fectively be dealt with only by the international community that America has
done so much to create—a community embracing the bulk of the Islamic
world—and that still needs American leadership if it is to function effectively.
There is considerable risk that otherwise, however effective America’s armed
forces may prove in the field and however many “regime changes” they may pre-
cipitate, the United States may end up not only alienating its traditional allies
but indefinitely facing a sullen and hostile Islamic world where terrorists con-
tinue to breed prolifically and the supporters of the West live in a state of perma-
nent siege. It would be a world in which, to my own perhaps parochial
perspective, countries like Britain with large Islamic minorities will live under a
perpetual shadow of race war. Is it too much to hope that I shall live to see a
world where it is safe to have trash cans in our railway stations?
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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